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|a Endogenous institution formation in public good games: the effect of economic education
|c Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, Dmitri Bershadskyy, Philipp Schreck, Florian Timme
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|a In a public good experiment, the paper analyses to which extent individuals with economic education behave differently in a second-order dilemma. Second-order dilemmas may arise, when individuals endogenously build up costly institutions that help to overcome a public good problem (first-order dilemma). The specific institution used in the experiment is a communication platform allowing for group communication before the first-order public good game takes place. The experimental results confirm the finding of the literature that economists tend to free ride more intensively in public good games than non-economists. The difference is the strongest in the end-game phase, yielding in the conclusion that the magnitude of the end-game effect depends on the share of economists in the pool of participants. When it comes to the building-up of institutions, the individual efficiency gain of the institution and its inherent cost function constitute the driving forces for the contribution behaviour. Providing an investment friendly environment yields in economists contributing more to the institution than non-economists. Therefore, we make clear that first-order results of a simple public good game cannot be simply applied for second-order incentive problems.
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Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin, Bershadskyy, Dmitri, Schreck, Philipp, Timme, Florian |
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Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin, Bershadskyy, Dmitri, Schreck, Philipp, Timme, Florian |
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In a public good experiment, the paper analyses to which extent individuals with economic education behave differently in a second-order dilemma. Second-order dilemmas may arise, when individuals endogenously build up costly institutions that help to overcome a public good problem (first-order dilemma). The specific institution used in the experiment is a communication platform allowing for group communication before the first-order public good game takes place. The experimental results confirm the finding of the literature that economists tend to free ride more intensively in public good games than non-economists. The difference is the strongest in the end-game phase, yielding in the conclusion that the magnitude of the end-game effect depends on the share of economists in the pool of participants. When it comes to the building-up of institutions, the individual efficiency gain of the institution and its inherent cost function constitute the driving forces for the contribution behaviour. Providing an investment friendly environment yields in economists contributing more to the institution than non-economists. Therefore, we make clear that first-order results of a simple public good game cannot be simply applied for second-order incentive problems. |
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Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin 1976- VerfasserIn (DE-588)132842467 (DE-627)63285037X (DE-576)32714534X aut, Endogenous institution formation in public good games: the effect of economic education Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, Dmitri Bershadskyy, Philipp Schreck, Florian Timme, Halle (Saale), Germany Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) - Member of the Leibniz Association [27. Dezember 2017], 1 Online-Ressource (III, 27 Seiten, 1 MB) Diagramme, Text txt rdacontent, Computermedien c rdamedia, Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier, IWH discussion papers 2017, no. 29 (December 2017), In a public good experiment, the paper analyses to which extent individuals with economic education behave differently in a second-order dilemma. Second-order dilemmas may arise, when individuals endogenously build up costly institutions that help to overcome a public good problem (first-order dilemma). The specific institution used in the experiment is a communication platform allowing for group communication before the first-order public good game takes place. The experimental results confirm the finding of the literature that economists tend to free ride more intensively in public good games than non-economists. The difference is the strongest in the end-game phase, yielding in the conclusion that the magnitude of the end-game effect depends on the share of economists in the pool of participants. When it comes to the building-up of institutions, the individual efficiency gain of the institution and its inherent cost function constitute the driving forces for the contribution behaviour. Providing an investment friendly environment yields in economists contributing more to the institution than non-economists. Therefore, we make clear that first-order results of a simple public good game cannot be simply applied for second-order incentive problems., Archivierung/Langzeitarchivierung gewährleistet pdager DE-3, Arbeitspapier DE-206, Online-Publikation DE-206, Bershadskyy, Dmitri 1988- VerfasserIn (DE-588)1166242900 (DE-627)1030255326 (DE-576)510683576 aut, Schreck, Philipp 1978- VerfasserIn (DE-588)137519710 (DE-627)593196872 (DE-576)303809949 aut, Timme, Florian 1985- VerfasserIn (DE-588)1199321974 (DE-627)1681620308 aut, Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle IWH-Diskussionspapiere 2017, no. 29 (December 2017) 2017,29 (DE-627)837399270 (DE-576)44618960X (DE-600)2836591-4 2194-2188, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/173200 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext, http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-83616 Resolving-System Volltext, http://www.iwh-halle.de/publikationen/detail/endogenous-institution-formation-in-public-good-games-the-effect-of-economic-education/ Verlag kostenfrei Volltext, http://www.iwh-halle.de/fileadmin/user_upload/publications/iwh_discussion_papers/iwh-discussion-paper_2017-29_Altemeyer-Bartscher_Bershadskyy_Schreck_Timme.pdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/173200 LFER, LFER 2019-05-07T00:00:00Z |
| spellingShingle |
Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin, Bershadskyy, Dmitri, Schreck, Philipp, Timme, Florian, Endogenous institution formation in public good games: the effect of economic education, Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, IWH-Diskussionspapiere, 2017, no. 29 (December 2017), In a public good experiment, the paper analyses to which extent individuals with economic education behave differently in a second-order dilemma. Second-order dilemmas may arise, when individuals endogenously build up costly institutions that help to overcome a public good problem (first-order dilemma). The specific institution used in the experiment is a communication platform allowing for group communication before the first-order public good game takes place. The experimental results confirm the finding of the literature that economists tend to free ride more intensively in public good games than non-economists. The difference is the strongest in the end-game phase, yielding in the conclusion that the magnitude of the end-game effect depends on the share of economists in the pool of participants. When it comes to the building-up of institutions, the individual efficiency gain of the institution and its inherent cost function constitute the driving forces for the contribution behaviour. Providing an investment friendly environment yields in economists contributing more to the institution than non-economists. Therefore, we make clear that first-order results of a simple public good game cannot be simply applied for second-order incentive problems., Arbeitspapier, Online-Publikation |
| title |
Endogenous institution formation in public good games: the effect of economic education |
| title_auth |
Endogenous institution formation in public good games: the effect of economic education |
| title_full |
Endogenous institution formation in public good games: the effect of economic education Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, Dmitri Bershadskyy, Philipp Schreck, Florian Timme |
| title_fullStr |
Endogenous institution formation in public good games: the effect of economic education Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, Dmitri Bershadskyy, Philipp Schreck, Florian Timme |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Endogenous institution formation in public good games: the effect of economic education Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, Dmitri Bershadskyy, Philipp Schreck, Florian Timme |
| title_in_hierarchy |
2017, no. 29 (December 2017). Endogenous institution formation in public good games: the effect of economic education ([27. Dezember 2017]) |
| title_short |
Endogenous institution formation in public good games: the effect of economic education |
| title_sort |
endogenous institution formation in public good games the effect of economic education |
| title_unstemmed |
Endogenous institution formation in public good games: the effect of economic education |
| topic |
Arbeitspapier, Online-Publikation |
| topic_facet |
Arbeitspapier, Online-Publikation |
| url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/173200, http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-83616, http://www.iwh-halle.de/publikationen/detail/endogenous-institution-formation-in-public-good-games-the-effect-of-economic-education/, http://www.iwh-halle.de/fileadmin/user_upload/publications/iwh_discussion_papers/iwh-discussion-paper_2017-29_Altemeyer-Bartscher_Bershadskyy_Schreck_Timme.pdf |
| urn |
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-83616 |
