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Fractional Hedonic Games
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Zeitschriftentitel: | ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation |
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Personen und Körperschaften: | , , , , , |
In: | ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 7, 2019, 2, S. 1-29 |
Medientyp: | E-Article |
Sprache: | Englisch |
veröffentlicht: |
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
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Schlagwörter: |
author_facet |
Aziz, Haris Brandl, Florian Brandt, Felix Harrenstein, Paul Olsen, Martin Peters, Dominik Aziz, Haris Brandl, Florian Brandt, Felix Harrenstein, Paul Olsen, Martin Peters, Dominik |
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author |
Aziz, Haris Brandl, Florian Brandt, Felix Harrenstein, Paul Olsen, Martin Peters, Dominik |
spellingShingle |
Aziz, Haris Brandl, Florian Brandt, Felix Harrenstein, Paul Olsen, Martin Peters, Dominik ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Fractional Hedonic Games Computational Mathematics Marketing Economics and Econometrics Statistics and Probability Computer Science (miscellaneous) |
author_sort |
aziz, haris |
spelling |
Aziz, Haris Brandl, Florian Brandt, Felix Harrenstein, Paul Olsen, Martin Peters, Dominik 2167-8375 2167-8383 Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) Computational Mathematics Marketing Economics and Econometrics Statistics and Probability Computer Science (miscellaneous) http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3327970 <jats:p> The work we present in this article initiated the formal study of <jats:italic>fractional hedonic games</jats:italic> (FHGs), coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings, this covers situations in which players only distinguish between friends and non-friends and desire to be in a coalition in which the fraction of friends is maximal. FHGs thus not only constitute a natural class of succinctly representable coalition formation games but also provide an interesting framework for network clustering. We propose a number of conditions under which the core of FHGs is non-empty and provide algorithms for computing a core stable outcome. By contrast, we show that the core may be empty in other cases, and that it is computationally hard in general to decide non-emptiness of the core. </jats:p> Fractional Hedonic Games ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation |
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title |
Fractional Hedonic Games |
title_unstemmed |
Fractional Hedonic Games |
title_full |
Fractional Hedonic Games |
title_fullStr |
Fractional Hedonic Games |
title_full_unstemmed |
Fractional Hedonic Games |
title_short |
Fractional Hedonic Games |
title_sort |
fractional hedonic games |
topic |
Computational Mathematics Marketing Economics and Econometrics Statistics and Probability Computer Science (miscellaneous) |
url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3327970 |
publishDate |
2019 |
physical |
1-29 |
description |
<jats:p>
The work we present in this article initiated the formal study of
<jats:italic>fractional hedonic games</jats:italic>
(FHGs), coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings, this covers situations in which players only distinguish between friends and non-friends and desire to be in a coalition in which the fraction of friends is maximal. FHGs thus not only constitute a natural class of succinctly representable coalition formation games but also provide an interesting framework for network clustering. We propose a number of conditions under which the core of FHGs is non-empty and provide algorithms for computing a core stable outcome. By contrast, we show that the core may be empty in other cases, and that it is computationally hard in general to decide non-emptiness of the core.
</jats:p> |
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author | Aziz, Haris, Brandl, Florian, Brandt, Felix, Harrenstein, Paul, Olsen, Martin, Peters, Dominik |
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description | <jats:p> The work we present in this article initiated the formal study of <jats:italic>fractional hedonic games</jats:italic> (FHGs), coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings, this covers situations in which players only distinguish between friends and non-friends and desire to be in a coalition in which the fraction of friends is maximal. FHGs thus not only constitute a natural class of succinctly representable coalition formation games but also provide an interesting framework for network clustering. We propose a number of conditions under which the core of FHGs is non-empty and provide algorithms for computing a core stable outcome. By contrast, we show that the core may be empty in other cases, and that it is computationally hard in general to decide non-emptiness of the core. </jats:p> |
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spelling | Aziz, Haris Brandl, Florian Brandt, Felix Harrenstein, Paul Olsen, Martin Peters, Dominik 2167-8375 2167-8383 Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) Computational Mathematics Marketing Economics and Econometrics Statistics and Probability Computer Science (miscellaneous) http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3327970 <jats:p> The work we present in this article initiated the formal study of <jats:italic>fractional hedonic games</jats:italic> (FHGs), coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings, this covers situations in which players only distinguish between friends and non-friends and desire to be in a coalition in which the fraction of friends is maximal. FHGs thus not only constitute a natural class of succinctly representable coalition formation games but also provide an interesting framework for network clustering. We propose a number of conditions under which the core of FHGs is non-empty and provide algorithms for computing a core stable outcome. By contrast, we show that the core may be empty in other cases, and that it is computationally hard in general to decide non-emptiness of the core. </jats:p> Fractional Hedonic Games ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation |
spellingShingle | Aziz, Haris, Brandl, Florian, Brandt, Felix, Harrenstein, Paul, Olsen, Martin, Peters, Dominik, ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Fractional Hedonic Games, Computational Mathematics, Marketing, Economics and Econometrics, Statistics and Probability, Computer Science (miscellaneous) |
title | Fractional Hedonic Games |
title_full | Fractional Hedonic Games |
title_fullStr | Fractional Hedonic Games |
title_full_unstemmed | Fractional Hedonic Games |
title_short | Fractional Hedonic Games |
title_sort | fractional hedonic games |
title_unstemmed | Fractional Hedonic Games |
topic | Computational Mathematics, Marketing, Economics and Econometrics, Statistics and Probability, Computer Science (miscellaneous) |
url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3327970 |