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Fractional Hedonic Games

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Zeitschriftentitel: ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Personen und Körperschaften: Aziz, Haris, Brandl, Florian, Brandt, Felix, Harrenstein, Paul, Olsen, Martin, Peters, Dominik
In: ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 7, 2019, 2, S. 1-29
Medientyp: E-Article
Sprache: Englisch
veröffentlicht:
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Schlagwörter:
author_facet Aziz, Haris
Brandl, Florian
Brandt, Felix
Harrenstein, Paul
Olsen, Martin
Peters, Dominik
Aziz, Haris
Brandl, Florian
Brandt, Felix
Harrenstein, Paul
Olsen, Martin
Peters, Dominik
author Aziz, Haris
Brandl, Florian
Brandt, Felix
Harrenstein, Paul
Olsen, Martin
Peters, Dominik
spellingShingle Aziz, Haris
Brandl, Florian
Brandt, Felix
Harrenstein, Paul
Olsen, Martin
Peters, Dominik
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Fractional Hedonic Games
Computational Mathematics
Marketing
Economics and Econometrics
Statistics and Probability
Computer Science (miscellaneous)
author_sort aziz, haris
spelling Aziz, Haris Brandl, Florian Brandt, Felix Harrenstein, Paul Olsen, Martin Peters, Dominik 2167-8375 2167-8383 Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) Computational Mathematics Marketing Economics and Econometrics Statistics and Probability Computer Science (miscellaneous) http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3327970 <jats:p> The work we present in this article initiated the formal study of <jats:italic>fractional hedonic games</jats:italic> (FHGs), coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings, this covers situations in which players only distinguish between friends and non-friends and desire to be in a coalition in which the fraction of friends is maximal. FHGs thus not only constitute a natural class of succinctly representable coalition formation games but also provide an interesting framework for network clustering. We propose a number of conditions under which the core of FHGs is non-empty and provide algorithms for computing a core stable outcome. By contrast, we show that the core may be empty in other cases, and that it is computationally hard in general to decide non-emptiness of the core. </jats:p> Fractional Hedonic Games ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
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title Fractional Hedonic Games
title_unstemmed Fractional Hedonic Games
title_full Fractional Hedonic Games
title_fullStr Fractional Hedonic Games
title_full_unstemmed Fractional Hedonic Games
title_short Fractional Hedonic Games
title_sort fractional hedonic games
topic Computational Mathematics
Marketing
Economics and Econometrics
Statistics and Probability
Computer Science (miscellaneous)
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3327970
publishDate 2019
physical 1-29
description <jats:p> The work we present in this article initiated the formal study of <jats:italic>fractional hedonic games</jats:italic> (FHGs), coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings, this covers situations in which players only distinguish between friends and non-friends and desire to be in a coalition in which the fraction of friends is maximal. FHGs thus not only constitute a natural class of succinctly representable coalition formation games but also provide an interesting framework for network clustering. We propose a number of conditions under which the core of FHGs is non-empty and provide algorithms for computing a core stable outcome. By contrast, we show that the core may be empty in other cases, and that it is computationally hard in general to decide non-emptiness of the core. </jats:p>
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author Aziz, Haris, Brandl, Florian, Brandt, Felix, Harrenstein, Paul, Olsen, Martin, Peters, Dominik
author_facet Aziz, Haris, Brandl, Florian, Brandt, Felix, Harrenstein, Paul, Olsen, Martin, Peters, Dominik, Aziz, Haris, Brandl, Florian, Brandt, Felix, Harrenstein, Paul, Olsen, Martin, Peters, Dominik
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description <jats:p> The work we present in this article initiated the formal study of <jats:italic>fractional hedonic games</jats:italic> (FHGs), coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings, this covers situations in which players only distinguish between friends and non-friends and desire to be in a coalition in which the fraction of friends is maximal. FHGs thus not only constitute a natural class of succinctly representable coalition formation games but also provide an interesting framework for network clustering. We propose a number of conditions under which the core of FHGs is non-empty and provide algorithms for computing a core stable outcome. By contrast, we show that the core may be empty in other cases, and that it is computationally hard in general to decide non-emptiness of the core. </jats:p>
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spelling Aziz, Haris Brandl, Florian Brandt, Felix Harrenstein, Paul Olsen, Martin Peters, Dominik 2167-8375 2167-8383 Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) Computational Mathematics Marketing Economics and Econometrics Statistics and Probability Computer Science (miscellaneous) http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3327970 <jats:p> The work we present in this article initiated the formal study of <jats:italic>fractional hedonic games</jats:italic> (FHGs), coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings, this covers situations in which players only distinguish between friends and non-friends and desire to be in a coalition in which the fraction of friends is maximal. FHGs thus not only constitute a natural class of succinctly representable coalition formation games but also provide an interesting framework for network clustering. We propose a number of conditions under which the core of FHGs is non-empty and provide algorithms for computing a core stable outcome. By contrast, we show that the core may be empty in other cases, and that it is computationally hard in general to decide non-emptiness of the core. </jats:p> Fractional Hedonic Games ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
spellingShingle Aziz, Haris, Brandl, Florian, Brandt, Felix, Harrenstein, Paul, Olsen, Martin, Peters, Dominik, ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Fractional Hedonic Games, Computational Mathematics, Marketing, Economics and Econometrics, Statistics and Probability, Computer Science (miscellaneous)
title Fractional Hedonic Games
title_full Fractional Hedonic Games
title_fullStr Fractional Hedonic Games
title_full_unstemmed Fractional Hedonic Games
title_short Fractional Hedonic Games
title_sort fractional hedonic games
title_unstemmed Fractional Hedonic Games
topic Computational Mathematics, Marketing, Economics and Econometrics, Statistics and Probability, Computer Science (miscellaneous)
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3327970