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NATO, Rational Escalation and Flexible Response
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| Zeitschriftentitel: | Journal of Peace Research |
|---|---|
| Personen und Körperschaften: | |
| In: | Journal of Peace Research, 29, 1992, 4, S. 435-454 |
| Medientyp: | E-Article |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| veröffentlicht: |
Sage Publications
|
| author_facet |
Zagare, Frank C. Zagare, Frank C. |
|---|---|
| author |
Zagare, Frank C. |
| spellingShingle |
Zagare, Frank C. Journal of Peace Research NATO, Rational Escalation and Flexible Response |
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zagare, frank c. |
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Zagare, Frank C. 0022-3433 Sage Publications https://www.jstor.org/stable/425543 <p>A multi-stage escalation model is developed in which each stage is taken as a psychologically distinct and empirically feasible mode of conflict available to two states in a hostile, deterrent relationship. Each stage is defined by a generic, extensive-form game of mutual deterrence in which the credibility of each player's threat is allowed to vary. In the multi-stage model these games are linked to one another by way of a common outcome, creating a new game with a distinct dynamic. The results of previous research on one- and two-stage games are summarized and the model extended to games with three stages. A three-stage escalation game composed solely of one of the three possible one-stage deterrence games has strategic characteristics identical to those of its component parts: mutual credibility at each stage implies stable deterrence; mutually incredible threats at every stage result in an unstable deterrence relationship, as does an asymmetry of credibility at all three stages of the game. In other ways, however, three-stage games are more like their two-stage than their one-stage counterparts. Three-stage games exhibit the same stability-instability paradox revealed in two-stage structures and continue to support the argument that escalation dominance at any stage of the game is usually destabilizing. And, as in two-stage escalation games, the end game is the most diagnostic of the stability characteristics of a status quo outcome. The implications of the model for NATO strategy and arms control under a variety of conditions are discussed. Assumptions about end game credibility are shown to be critical in determining the wisdom of eliminating either one or two conflict stages.</p> NATO, Rational Escalation and Flexible Response Journal of Peace Research |
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1992 |
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435-454 |
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<p>A multi-stage escalation model is developed in which each stage is taken as a psychologically distinct and empirically feasible mode of conflict available to two states in a hostile, deterrent relationship. Each stage is defined by a generic, extensive-form game of mutual deterrence in which the credibility of each player's threat is allowed to vary. In the multi-stage model these games are linked to one another by way of a common outcome, creating a new game with a distinct dynamic. The results of previous research on one- and two-stage games are summarized and the model extended to games with three stages. A three-stage escalation game composed solely of one of the three possible one-stage deterrence games has strategic characteristics identical to those of its component parts: mutual credibility at each stage implies stable deterrence; mutually incredible threats at every stage result in an unstable deterrence relationship, as does an asymmetry of credibility at all three stages of the game. In other ways, however, three-stage games are more like their two-stage than their one-stage counterparts. Three-stage games exhibit the same stability-instability paradox revealed in two-stage structures and continue to support the argument that escalation dominance at any stage of the game is usually destabilizing. And, as in two-stage escalation games, the end game is the most diagnostic of the stability characteristics of a status quo outcome. The implications of the model for NATO strategy and arms control under a variety of conditions are discussed. Assumptions about end game credibility are shown to be critical in determining the wisdom of eliminating either one or two conflict stages.</p> |
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| description | <p>A multi-stage escalation model is developed in which each stage is taken as a psychologically distinct and empirically feasible mode of conflict available to two states in a hostile, deterrent relationship. Each stage is defined by a generic, extensive-form game of mutual deterrence in which the credibility of each player's threat is allowed to vary. In the multi-stage model these games are linked to one another by way of a common outcome, creating a new game with a distinct dynamic. The results of previous research on one- and two-stage games are summarized and the model extended to games with three stages. A three-stage escalation game composed solely of one of the three possible one-stage deterrence games has strategic characteristics identical to those of its component parts: mutual credibility at each stage implies stable deterrence; mutually incredible threats at every stage result in an unstable deterrence relationship, as does an asymmetry of credibility at all three stages of the game. In other ways, however, three-stage games are more like their two-stage than their one-stage counterparts. Three-stage games exhibit the same stability-instability paradox revealed in two-stage structures and continue to support the argument that escalation dominance at any stage of the game is usually destabilizing. And, as in two-stage escalation games, the end game is the most diagnostic of the stability characteristics of a status quo outcome. The implications of the model for NATO strategy and arms control under a variety of conditions are discussed. Assumptions about end game credibility are shown to be critical in determining the wisdom of eliminating either one or two conflict stages.</p> |
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| spelling | Zagare, Frank C. 0022-3433 Sage Publications https://www.jstor.org/stable/425543 <p>A multi-stage escalation model is developed in which each stage is taken as a psychologically distinct and empirically feasible mode of conflict available to two states in a hostile, deterrent relationship. Each stage is defined by a generic, extensive-form game of mutual deterrence in which the credibility of each player's threat is allowed to vary. In the multi-stage model these games are linked to one another by way of a common outcome, creating a new game with a distinct dynamic. The results of previous research on one- and two-stage games are summarized and the model extended to games with three stages. A three-stage escalation game composed solely of one of the three possible one-stage deterrence games has strategic characteristics identical to those of its component parts: mutual credibility at each stage implies stable deterrence; mutually incredible threats at every stage result in an unstable deterrence relationship, as does an asymmetry of credibility at all three stages of the game. In other ways, however, three-stage games are more like their two-stage than their one-stage counterparts. Three-stage games exhibit the same stability-instability paradox revealed in two-stage structures and continue to support the argument that escalation dominance at any stage of the game is usually destabilizing. And, as in two-stage escalation games, the end game is the most diagnostic of the stability characteristics of a status quo outcome. The implications of the model for NATO strategy and arms control under a variety of conditions are discussed. Assumptions about end game credibility are shown to be critical in determining the wisdom of eliminating either one or two conflict stages.</p> NATO, Rational Escalation and Flexible Response Journal of Peace Research |
| spellingShingle | Zagare, Frank C., Journal of Peace Research, NATO, Rational Escalation and Flexible Response |
| title | NATO, Rational Escalation and Flexible Response |
| title_full | NATO, Rational Escalation and Flexible Response |
| title_fullStr | NATO, Rational Escalation and Flexible Response |
| title_full_unstemmed | NATO, Rational Escalation and Flexible Response |
| title_short | NATO, Rational Escalation and Flexible Response |
| title_sort | nato, rational escalation and flexible response |
| title_unstemmed | NATO, Rational Escalation and Flexible Response |
| url | https://www.jstor.org/stable/425543 |